The use of placebos in therapy or research poses ethical questions. What are the benefits and the costs in ethical terms of condoning deception of the patient or subject? What does the deception mean for the patient's or subject's right to give informed consent to his treatment? Doctors are rightly expected to disclose to their patient facts which would in their judgement best enable him to give informed consent to treatment. On occasion, the degree of this disclosure may be limited by the need to avoid hazarding the success of treatment of an unstable patient whose condition threatens his life, but doctors should have no right to withhold information just to prevent a patient refusing consent to therapy. No such limitation should apply in experiments where full disclosure must operate to enable the subject to give his informed consent.
The potential medical benefits for the patient of placebo therapy have to be weighed against all the ethical costs of the deception and dishonesty involved, including the longer term repercussions on doctor/patient trust: similar ethical costs may arise in experiments involving the use ofplacebos without disclosure of this as a possibility to the subject. Deception is ethically degrading to both parties not only being a breach of trust, but denying the moral autonomy of the patient or subject to make his own choice.
The writer concludes that placebos should be used only with full disclosure and consent whether in therapy or in research, and that this need not impede the success of either.
Arthur K. Shapiro defines a placebo as 'any therapy or component of therapy that is deliberately or knowingly used for its non-specific, psychologic, or psycho-physiologic effect, or that... unknown to the patient or therapist, is without specific activity for the condition being treated.'" Dubois lists three classes of placebos: i) Inert substances, such as lactose and starch; 2) Pseudomedicaments, such as herb extracts and superfluous vitamins; 3) Specific therapeutic agents.2
To these classes of placebos, Bok adds that any medical procedure may have an implicit placebo effect. She writes 'Nowdays, fewer sugar pills are prescribed, but x-rays, vitamin preparations, antibiotics, and even surgery can function as placebos."
When we speak of the 'placebo effect,' we are referring to any change in a patient's condition attributable to a pill, potion, or procedure (but not due to its specific pharmacodynamic properties), which derives from the significance the patient attaches to the whole therapeutic effort.
Placebos have been used for centuries by physicians under pressure to 'do something' but wishing to do no harm; to pacify without actually benefiting the patient. The benefit, however, has proved unexpectedly lavish, as Wolf suggests: Not only has the hopeful reassurance of placebos engendered in patients a feeling of increased well-being, but experimental evidence has shown that placebo administration may be followed by substantial and measurable changes in bodily mechanism.2
Patients have come to expect, some even to demand, a medication for every symptom. The placebo appears to be the most expedient 'remedy' for inorganic 'diseases.' One physician explained: I cannot understand why those of us trained to take care of organic diseases can't be allowed to take care of them. Why won't these people take our word for it that there is nothing wrong with them and let it go at that? There seems no way of handling them, except that sort of semi-quackery that some highly respected members of our fraternity are able to get away with successfully.3
Patient pressure and 'unexpectedly lavish results' may be two of the most potent forces perpetuating the resort to placebos in lieu of therapy. Studies indicate that a sugar pill may be half as effective as a standard dose of morphine for some people. Evans has found that in a typical clinical study, three out of twelve persons will gain no relief from pain from any medication, yet four of the twelve -one-third of the patients -will experience equal relief from either the placebo or the morphine.4 A plethora of studies indicates reaction to placebos may involve practically any organ system in the body. Placebos have provided some degree of relief for an average of 35 per cent of the patients in cases of angina pectoris, arthritis, pain, hayfever, headache, cough, ulcers, and essential hypertension.5
Placebo effects are neither imaginary nor suggestive in the usual sense of these words. Careful studies fail to find any relationship between suggestibility, gullibility, and sensitivity to placebos.3 Although the Problems in deceptive medical procedures I73 physiological details are not clear, the placebo effect seems to be derived from a combination of factors involving the patient, the pliysician, and the relationship between the two.6
The prescription of placebos as therapy has become commonplace. Berton writes: 'The most widely used drugs in the modern medicine cabinet are not really drugs at all . . . They are chemotherapeutically inert. They possess no curative powers whatever, or have none that are contextually relevant.'6 Some estimates suggest that placebos comprise 30-45 per cent of all prescriptions. The opinion in this case goes on to state, however, that the discretion given the physician as to the degree of disclosure must be consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary for an informed consent. Moreover, the Natanson case does not justify treatment without the patient's informed consent merely because the physician would think it for the patient's benefit: A doctor might well believe that an operation or form of treatment is desirable or necessary, but the law does not permit him to substitute his own judgement for that of the patient by any form of artifice or deception.10
It would be a complete perversion of this principle of 'therapeutic privilege' to argue that a doctor is justified in withholding information because a patient would, quite calmly, on the basis of that information, refuse therapy the doctor deems desirable.1' Finally, Justice Schroeder's language in Natanson implies the privilege only accrues when the patient is severely and exceptionally unstable, and where some 'dread disease' would imperil his life. The court refused in this case to speculate on the applicability of such a privilege where the benefits ofnon-disclosure are uncertain or marginal, or where human life is not at stake.
INFORMED CONSENT IN RESEARCH
The placebo in the research setting is custom-made to deceive: it exactly replicates the drug under investigation. Of ten studies of the placebo effect surveyed by Bok, only one indicated that those subjected to the experiment were informed they might receive placebos; indeed, in six, there was mention of intentional deception.1
The prevalence of deception in these studies indicates the extent of research carried out with less than fully informed consent. According to the (US) Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's Regulation of the Protection of Human Subjects, the basic elements of information necessary to give an informed consent includes: I) A fair explanation of the procedure to be followed and its purposes, including identification of any procedures that are experimental; 2) A description of any attendant discomforts and risks reasonably to be expected; 3) A description of any benefits reasonably to be expected; 4) A disclosure of any appropriate alternative procedures that might be advantageous for the subject; 5) An offer to answer any inquiries concerning the procedures; and 6) An instruction that the person is free to withdraw his consent and to discontinue participation in the project or activity at any time without prejudice to the subject.14 These requirements of the DHEW attempt, primarily, to provide protection to the human research participant, rather than to protect the researcher against legal action for damages.9 When requirements of informed consent are satisfied, the inherent inequalities between subject and investigator are brought somewhat closer to a balance (which safeguards the subject's autonomy and limits risk of harm to a level acceptable to him). Thus, as Ramsey maintains, informed consent functions to bring otherwise inherently unequal parties into a 'joint adventure' or 'partnership': An informed consent establishes medical investigations as voluntary associations of free men in a common cause.... It lies at the heart of man's search for cures to all man's diseases as a great human adventure that is carried forward jointly by the investigator and his subjects. 5 Two non-therapeutic experimentation cases underscore the point that nornal volunteers can never be considered patients. Whatever privileges of withholding information a physician may have on therapeutic grounds cannot be applied to the nontherapeutic situation. In Halushka v. the University of Saskatchewan (I965) the appeals court held that: There can be no exceptions to the ordinary requirements of disclosure in the case of research as three It is often assumed that the deception involved in the administration of placebos for the patient's own good is trivial. This assumption involves a value judgement which is, by the very nature of the situation in which the patient is in the dark, derived from the physician's, rather than the patient's value system. In the above example, the elderly woman paid $60 each year (from a very modest income) for nothing more than milk sugar. Moreover, physicians do not seem to consider the sheer humiliation of being deceived. Those who administer placebos must be giving special weight to the expected benefits, since the benefits are seen as overriding the element which makes all human interaction and discourse meaningful: mutual trust and respect. What indication is there that the deceived would give the benefits, such as a night's sleep, such special weight ? If physicians are to be in the business of deceiving for the patient's own good, are we prepared to extend this prerogative to surgery and superfluous x-rays, which may, too, benefit the patient through an implicit placebo effect ?
A digression is in order. The above analysis makes the generous assumption that the 'lavish results' described by Wolf in the I950S is a positive benefit. In reality, benefits are far from certain, and the placebo effect could even be harmful. In a survey of the literature on placebo research, Bok notes such adverse side-effects as nausea, dermatitis, and headaches."9 In a study by Wolf and Pinsky, I5 More good would be done in the long run, it seems, if the physician sat down with the patient in the early stages of the problem and explained the true nature of the problem, indicated either that no medication is necessary, or is known to be effective, and advised the patient how to best cope with or control these symptoms on his own. 'But the patient desires and expects the physician to give them medication for their symptom!' some may protest. Where did the patient get the idea that there is a drug for every symptom? To administer a placebo for any complaint is to perpetuate two widespread myths: that medicine can solve, and that medication ought to be used to solve, any problem a patient may bring to a physician.
Deceptive medical practices have repercussive implications which may go far beyond the immediate individual. The doctor-patient relationship creates certain expectations, reliance, and trust; the physician ratifies the patient's expectations by implicitly acknowledging that they are justified. Deliberately breaking this trust (even for the patient's own good) by prescribing inactive substances when the patient trusts he is receiving a potent drug, is a harm that extends beyond the wronged individual: in acting faithlessly, the very basis of our system of trust itself is eroded.'3
What would happen if patients discovered that doctors are condoning the widespread use of inert therapy-and collecting high fees for this 'service ?' I suggest that it will lead to distrust and eventual hostility-a hostility which is likely to be deeper because of the patient's acute awareness of his dependence on the profession. As this deception is realised, there may be a loss of confidence in all physicians and bona fide medicine: a breakdown in trust when trust is needed most.
Once we condone deception in certain situations, where do we draw the line between what must be disclosed and what ought to be withheld? No longer would lucidity carry its former value. Certainly, the justification of non-disclosure could be extended to active drugs or surgery for the desired placebo effect. The details of the condition ofthe seriously ill or dying patient could be radically distorted or even withheld under this principle. Condoning deception legitimises the claim that patients should have no say in their mode of therapy; it substitutes purely professional, paternalistic judgement for self-determination on the part of the individual.
EXPERIMENTATION
The use of a control group receiving an inactive substance is the only method medical science has devised thus far to compare active experimental drugs to no treatment (or to other drugs). Often such clinical trials contribute to advances in medicine which could benefit thousands of patients in the future.
It is widely believed that divulging the fact that there is a placebo in the experimental design would ruin the experiment by discouraging participation and reducing placebo effectiveness. Lasagna writes: When one is trying to diminish prejudice for or against a remedy, it is probably preferable, at least scientifically, for subjects and observers to be kept in the dark. To begin with, patients told that they may receive placebos may refuse to participate in the trial. If such refusals are few, they need not inconvenience the experiment or the experimenter. But if they are frequent, not only will the trial be prolonged but the generalisations possible at the end may be seriously limited, in view of the possible atypical nature of the sample.22 Similarly, Libermann has written: If subjects were forewarned of placebo administration, many would not cooperate with the experimenter -such candid statements of placebo use early in the experiment would engender suspicion and perhaps hostility in the subjects, making them undesirable, if not unwilling candidates for placebo research.23 Lasagna's reasoning is interesting: not only would he approve of subordinating the individual to the purposes of medical science. but also for its convenience. He fears that informing participants of the presence of a placebo would prolong the experiment. But he does not claim that it would be impossible for informed consent, nor would the findings be seriously impaired (given that it might be possible to take the placebo effect into account in the interpretation of the data). In short, informing the volunteers of the presence of the placebo in the experimental design would, at worst, inconvenience the experiment, but would not make it impossible.
Libermann has a slightly different objection: participants would be suspicious of, and hostile to an experimenter who tells them they might receive a placebo. If Libermann is referring to patients with a disorder which an active experimental drug has a good chance of improving, the hostility is understandable: patients are justifiably more interested in their personal health than advancing medical knowledge. Moreover, a good case can be made that patient-volunteers' consent is less freely given because oftheir unique dependence on the physician (and their likely vulnerability to any subtle pressure). Whatever the health status of the volunteers, hostility is likely to be much greater if they find out ex post facto that they have been deceived, rather than agreeing to be deceived at the onset of the experiment. In any case, such participant resistance, feared by both Lasagna and Libermann when placebos are involved, should not be used as a rationale to override informed consent; rather, it should be used as prima facie evidence that the experiment, as presently designed, is unacceptable to our society's ethical sensitivities.
When calculating benefits of the research versus 
Formalist considerations
The above analysis assumes that it is sufficient merely to look at the consequences of a particular action in deciding if that action is ethical. But even if placebos are always beneficial on balance, the nature of the deception itself, regardless of the consequences, is an independent justification for stringent restrictions of placebo use: i) Persons have a primafacie duty of fidelity to one another, to be overridden in only the most extreme cases, 2) Our autonomy as individuals (and therefore our very humanness) is denigrated when we are deprived the opportunity to make individual moral choices. . . . normally promise-keeping . . . should come before benevolence but when, and only when, the good to be produced by the benevolent act is very great and the promise comparatively trivial, the act of benevolence becomes our duty27 (author's emphasis).
One of the most evident facts of our moral consciousness is the sanctity we give to telling the truth, which is not dependent on the good which disclosure might bring. The inherent rightness or wrongness of certain acts is recognised by Ramsey when he emphasises that: Medical ethics is not solely a benefit producing ethics, even in regard to the individual patient, since he should not always be helped without his will. . . . There must be a determination of the rightness and wrongness of the action, and not only of the good to be obtained in medical care or from medical investigation.'r Some have challenged my assumption that patients come to physicians expecting the truth regarding their condition and therapy, in addition to expecting a physical benefit. 'I've been dealing with patients for thirty years, and I know what they really want,' some physicians may say.
What patients actually do or do not want (benevolent deception or the truth) is a question which requires empirical verification. Unfortunately, empirical studies of patients' attitudes regarding benevolent deception as it involves placebo administration per se are not available. However, at least one area of benevolent deception (involving the disclosure or non-disclosure of a cancer diagnosis) present consistent evidence that patients prefer to be told the truth (88, 87, 89, 82 and 98 5 per cent in four independent studies) 28 whereas physicians believe it preferable to withhold the information for the patient's sake (only i2 per cent of the physicians usually tell their cancer patients of the diagnosis).29
Although the psychology of the cancer patient and the candidate for a placebo undoubtedly differ, the pattern is remarkably distinct: patients prefer, at least in some situations, to have access to more information than physicians feel it in their best interest to divulge.
Although these data are not proof of all patients' desires in all situations, they do cast doubt on the ability of a physician accurately to predict decep- In the research situation, the patient-subject's autonomy is again at stake, but not for the sake of doing a procedure for his own good. To provide the patient-subject with all material information concerning the proposed use of his body is to respect his human dignity and enhance his autonomy; to violate his choice -through deception or withholding of useful information -is to treat him merely as a means to an end, and not as an end in himself. Deception of the volunteer in an experiment goes beyond denying him a 'human right', it denies him a portion of what it means to be human. The right to self-determination, as these cases imply, is a right independent of promoting benefits or minimising harm to the patient and/or society. If self-determination is a right, it is no less a right merely because benefits/risks to oneself are possible. Veatch writes: 'The principle of autonomy -the right to self-determination -provides an independent foundation for informed consent ... necessary for all invasions of the body or even invasions of one's privacy.'33 This is not to suggest that informed consent may not also do a lot of other nice things (e.g., avoid fraud and duress, encourage rational decision-making, and involve the public, as Katz suggests) 34 but rather that its primary purpose is to promote individual choice regarding one's body, not merely to promote consequentialist objectives mentioned above.
Conclusion and recommendations
Placebo administration necessitates the deception of patients and volunteer subjects by the medical profession. This deception tends to be unethical in light of the following considerations: I) The negative consequences of this deception tends to outweigh any positive benefits on balance;
2) The very nature of a deceptive act tends to make it wrong, independent of its consequences; 3) Deceiving the patient or subject has serious implications on his right of self-determination, and therefore on his human dignity. On the basis of these considerations, I would make the following recommendations: THERAPY No substance should be administered to a patient deliberately to achieve a placebo effect unless they know the nature of both their 'disease' and the 'remedy'. If a placebo appears absolutely necessary (after the nature of the problem has been clearly disclosed and no other form of treatment is available and acceptable to the patient), the By implication, the participants could also, without serious harm to the experiment, be told that drugs may be interchanged with placebos, or that there is a constant placebo group throughout the duration of the experiment. The following might be a feasible research design:
Group I: Tell participants in this group that they will receive the active experimental drug, and administer that drug, as they have been informed; Group 2: Tell them that they may get the experimental drug or a placebo; administer the experimental drug;
Group 3: Same information as Group 2, but administer the placebo.
Assuming that the participants agree to this arrangement prior to the experiment, this design would protect the subject's choice, while at the same time protecting the scientific effort, since comparisons of expectations could still be made.
What would be an appropriate course of action in the hypothetical situation in which informing the volunteer of the presence of a placebo in the experimental design would ruin the experiment ? First, there must be an objective determination that the expected results of the research are of immediate importance. It is not enough that researchers themselves feel their research would be important, given the biases inherent in the .experimenter's attitude toward his own work. It might be desirable to include some competent lay persons to help determine the significance and immediacy of the expected findings. How important must the findings be? It is not enough that they be very interesting, or useful in some abstract future situation. Only an experiment that has a good chance of producing results of life-saving significance for large numbers of people ought to even be considered if deception is to be employed.
The obvious question to such a proposal is, why does a lot of benefit override formalist considerations of truth-telling and autonomy? To concede that great benefits alone merit such a trade-off would be to repudiate the inherent value of disclosing the truth and the absolute value of human beings as independent moral agents. A second criterion must be met to permit such research: there must be an objective determination that the subjects involved would consider the deception so trivial and the risks so miniscule that no compromise of their autonomy has been made. One way this might be done is to interview a very large number ofpotential volunteers, giving them all the facts of the procedure, including the disclosure of procedures which are deceptive. If those interviewed signify overwhelmingly that such a procedure would in no way offend them, then that is an indication that the proposed experiment, in the opinion of the reasonable person, makes no in-road into their autonomy. Wherever possible, subjects ought to be selected from the very population which indicated the deceptive research would not bother them. (I do not offer this plan as a substitute for existing requirements of informed consent outlined in the regulations of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, but as an additional safeguard in cases where it is impossible to disclose the presence of a placebo in an experiment.)
These standards of disclosure could protect both the integrity of the medical profession, and the dignity of the individual patient/subject, without seriously impeding therapeutic or scientific progress. Our society should reject any standard of disclosure which gains some physical benefit at the cost of human dignity.
